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I . Introduction
This report is an assessment of the state of knowledge
regarding the effects of sea pay on reenlistments and extensions
of enlisted personnel. These effects are important to Navy
manpower planners because they impact on the enlisted experience
distribution and on recruitment needs, both of which have major
implications for the cost of maintaining a force of any given
size. The report goes beyond merely reviewing the pertinent
research, as this has been done recently by Radtke (1984) and
Cooke (1985) . It attempts to (1) spell out what specific
information will be most useful to Navy manpower planners; (2)
evaluate the data and models used in conducting past research;
and (3) make recommendations regarding the direction of future
research.
Sea duty is an issue that cannot be divorced from any study
of the impacts of sea pay. A fundamental reason for sea pay is
to compensate personnel for the separation and discomfort of sea
duty. In general, the more time a sailor spends on sea duty, the
less likely he is to reenlist. Thus, sea pay helps to offset the
negative retention effects of sea duty. Most of the empirical
(and some of the theoretical) studies of sea pay also consider
the impact of sea duty. Unfortunately, as a result of both data
limitations and modeling choices, discussed below, the estimated
effects of sea duty on reenlistments and extensions are
inconsistent and not very statistically reliable.
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The report will also make recommendations for better
accounting for the role of sea duty. Perhaps the most important
reason for improved measurement and modeling of sea duty is that
estimates of the effects of sea pay may be biased without
accurate control for sea duty.
In order to establish a framework for the review and
analysis that follows, the major issues that have emerged in
determining the effects of sea pay on reenlistments and
extensions are summarized here. The fundamental question is to
what extent reenlistment and extension decisions are influenced
by the level of sea pay. The issues enumerated here address the
problem of estimating models whose parameters can provide valid
inferences about that influence.
(1) The interaction between reenlistments and extensions: Since
sea pay affects both, they should be considered jointly.
Moreover, the models should allow sea pay to have different
effects on each choice. However, most statistical models that do
so require that the choices be independent. If some enlisted men
extend for short periods in order to subsequently receive an
anticipated larger reenlistment bonus, then those statistical
models will not produce unbiased estimates of the desired
parameters.
(2) The effect of sea pay on sea duty needs to be considered
independently of its effects on reenlistments or extensions. The
main purpose of sea pay is to encourage sailors to spend more
time at sea by compensating them for the unpleasant aspects of
sea duty. The importance of this issue lies in the criticality
of manning the fleet.
(3) Self-selection into sea-intensive rating: The major
empirical studies have analyzed reenlistment behavior by
occupational categories, which vary in the average amount of time
spent on sea duty. If enlisted men are self-selecting into the
more sea duty intensive occupations because of their personal
taste for sea duty, attempts to infer the effect of differences
in sea duty on reenlistments will be biased. Therefore,
estimates of the effect on reenlistments of sea pay differences
needed to compensate for sea duty differences will also be
biased.
(4) Modeling of the impact of sea pay: Most studies have not
explicitly related sea pay to reenlistment or extension behavior;
they assume that pay elasticities are the same irrespective of
the source of the pay change. Although this approach is based on
accepted economic theory, it ignores the tie between sea pay and
sea duty. The one study (Radtke, 1984) that did explicitly
estimate separate sea pay effects found them to differ from the
effects of other pay, and also to have a perverse impact on
retention in some models.
(5) Aggregate vs. individual data: Most of the major studies
aggregate individual data into cells defined by length of
service, occupational specialty (ratings) and year of
reenlistment decision. This aggregation process necessitates
using cell averages for other explanatory variables (pay, sea
duty, demographic factors, etc.)/ which may bias the resulting
parameter estimates. Cooke (1986) found substantial variations
in sea duty within ratings, and that the sea pay differential can
vary with demographic factors like marital status, because of
loss of certain shore allowances when sailors are on sea duty.
These within cells variances exacerbate the aggregation bias
problem.
(6) Data limitations: The complex manner in which sea pay is
calculated, and the difference between sea duty for sea/shore
rotation and for sea pay, increase the difficulty of accurately
measuring sea pay for any individual or group.
(7) Quality of reenlistments/extension: The literature has
recognized the need to have rating-specific estimates of sea pay
and sea duty effects, but the guality of those persons has not
been considered. The continually increasing complexity of jobs
enlisted men must perform underscores the need for high guality
sailors. However, no studies to date have considered whether
variations in sea pay or sea duty have impacts on retention that
vary with education level and/or mental group. One might
speculate that the less able men, with less attractive civilian
alternatives, may be most responsive to sea pay incentives.
Thus, a policy that yielded adequate endstrength figures might
not satisfy Navy manpower needs in terms of ability to perform
the required tasks.
These issues provide the basic framework for reviewing the
literature on sea pay and sea duty. Clearly they are derived
from studying that literature, and serve to guide future
researchers toward improved analyses which will better inform
Navy manpower planners.
The report is organized as follows: the second section
contains a critical review of the empirical research on sea pay;
the third section identifies the gaps in our knowledge, and the
fourth section proposes a research agenda to fill those gaps.
II . Review of Literature
This section reviews the empirical studies of the retention
effects of sea pay. A brief review of the theoretical studies of
sea pay is also presented. The emphasis throughout is on the
limitations of the studies, rather than a comprehensive review of
their findings. This emphasis is not based on a desire to be
critical per se, but derives from the goal of identifying
weaknesses so that future research can be improved. Moreover, as
noted above, Cooke (1985) has recently done an extensive review
of the effects of sea pay and sea duty on retention. Some
sections below draw on that review, and the interested reader is
referred to that report (or the original works) for further
details.
The most recent theoretical studies of sea pay are by
Kleinman (1983) and Clay-Mendez (1983) . Both employ an
optimization approach. Kleinman asks how can the Navy most
economically achieve (1) an increase in sea duty holding constant
total manpower requirements or (2) and increase in total man-
years holding the percent of time on sea duty constant? Kleinman
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argues that an increase in reenlistment bonuses will increase
total man-years more than a rise in sea pay since the latter
requires additional sea duty, which has an offsetting negative
effect on reenlistments. However, increasing sea pay will be
more effective in increasing sea duty. These results lead
Kleinman to conclude that to increase total man-years (sea duty
constant) reenlistment bonuses should be increased but sea pay
decreased, since the additional reenlistments will necessarily
provide more man-years of sea duty. He also concludes that to
increase sea duty with constant total man-years the Navy should
raise sea pay but lower reenlistment bonuses, since the extra sea
pay will increase both reenlistments and extensions.
Clay-Mendez uses a more formal approach, deriving her
results from a model based on utility maximization by individual
enlisted men. The Navy sets sea pay and reenlistment bonuses so
as to minimize costs, and individuals choose whether to reenlist
or not. If sailors have homogeneous tastes for sea duty, a
desired reenlistment rate is attained at least cost using bonuses
alone, since raising sea pay increases extensions at the expense
of reenlistments. Clay-Mendez also finds that in general, if
tastes for sea duty vary, a constant sea/shore ratio is
inefficient since it fails to take advantage of those persons
with a preference for sea duty (i.e., those less averse to sea
duty would spend more time at sea for the same level of sea pay)
.
An exception to this result obtains if the distribution of tastes
for sea duty is such that the average percent of time sailors
wish to spend at sea exceeds the percent needed by the Navy.
This is clearly counter-factual, however.
These studies are interesting for two reasons. They provide
a benchmark for evaluating the empirical studies that attempt to
provide quantitative estimates of the effects predicted by the
theoretical analyses. In addition, they raise some interesting
issues: What balance between extensions and reenlistments is
optimal for the Navy? What influences enlisted men's taste for
sea duty?
Next we turn to four econometric studies of retention.
Three of the studies, by Warner and Goldberg (1982 and 1983) and
Goldberg and Warner (1983) , do not directly estimate sea pay
effects on retention, but those effects can be inferred from
their estimates of the sensitivity of reenlistments (and
extensions in one study) to changes in regular pay. The fourth
study, by Radtke (1984) , tests whether sea pay has different
effects than other forms of pay. All four studies use a common
methodology, which is described first. Then the major findings
of the studies are summarized.
The general approach of the four studies cited above is to
divide the large number of very specific occupational ratings of
enlisted personnel into a smaller number of occupational groups.
The ratings in each group are similar in terms of training, job
requirements and working conditions. The empirical model used in
all of the four studies is the now well-known annualized cost of
leaving (ACOL) model. The cost of leaving is "the difference
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between the present value of the income stream staying n more
years and then leaving and the income stream from leaving
immediately" (Goldberg and Warner, 1983, p. 9). The individual
stays in the Navy if his ACOL is greater than the present value
of his net preference for civilian life, i.e., the present value
of the income stream associated with staying in the Navy exceeds
the person's distaste for military life. By assuming that
preferences for civilian versus military life are normally
distributed, a non-linear relationship can be derived between
ACOL and the probability of reenlisting (or extending) . This
relationship is estimated by either probit analysis or logistic
regression. The estimated models also include other variables
which may influence retention behavior (e.g., marital status,
civilian unemployment rate, expected amount of sea duty during
next period of service)
.
The seminal study by Warner and Goldberg (1981) finds
statistically significant impacts of ACOL on first-term
reenlistments in 15 of 16 occupational groups. In addition, the
authors find a negative correlation between the weighted ACOL
estimates and the percent of careerists in sea duty in those
occupations, implying that sea duty reduces the elasticity of the
supply curves of enlisted personnel (as represented by the ACOL
coefficients) . However, Cooke (1985) notes that the correlation
between the unweighted pay elasticities and the sea duty of
careerists is much smaller than the weighted correlation, and
significant only at the .20 level. Thus, this finding is not
very convincing. Warner and Goldberg estimated another (cross-
sectional) model, that directly estimated the effects of sea
duty. The results of this model indicate a strong negative
relationship between expected future sea duty and reenlistments.
Although highly regarded, and widely used and cited, there
are some shortcomings to this study. Perhaps most important is
the specification of the basic probit equation. Besides ACOL,
the only other independent variables are marital status and the
civilian unemployment rate, which varies only over time and not
by occupational group or rating within each group. There are
surely other factors that may influence the reenlistment
decision. There is an extensive literature on civilian quit
behavior that identifies many job-related factors that affect
quitting: job satisfaction, performance ratings, promotion
rates, and fringe benefits (see Arnold and Feldman (1982) , Dreher
(1982), Keller (1984), Mitchell (1982), and Solnick (1988)). If
any of these omitted factors are correlated with both
reenlistments and ACOL, the estimates of the effect of ACOL on
reenlisting will be biased, the extent and direction of the bias
depending on the size and sign of the correlations between the
omitted variables and both reenlistment and ACOL.
The cross-sectional analysis of Warner and Goldberg has a
better specification since it includes a variable for expected
future sea duty. Although this variable is consistent with the
ACOL variable, in the sense that they both focus on the expected
future values of the variables, the approach ignores the
10
potentially large impact of past sea duty on the reenlistment
decision. It is plausible that past sea duty may significantly
affect reenlistment behavior by influencing each persons 's taste
for military versus civilian life. The omission of this and
other job satisfaction factors have an unknown but possibly large
impact on the estimates of the effect of ACOL.
Another deficiency of the Warner and Goldberg study is the
measurement of civilian pay, one of the two components of ACOL.
Civilian earnings are measured using the earnings of enlisted
personnel who left the Navy. Since this calculation considers
only those who chose to leave the Navy, their earnings are
subject to selection bias. Clearly those who leave, cet . par.
are those who on average find civilian life more attractive than
those who remain in the Navy. This can result from either a
stronger distaste for military life, or better civilian earnings,
or some combination of both. Thus, Warner and Goldberg's measure
of civilian earnings will tend to overstate those earnings, and
therefore underestimate ACOL, for enlisted personnel who
reenlist. This suggests an upward bias in the estimated
relationship between reenlisting and ACOL: Warner and Goldberg's
estimates may be larger than the true parameters.
Warner and Goldberg (1984) extended their study of
reenlistment decisions to analyze length of reenlistment. The
major determinant of length of reenlistment, given that the
decision to reenlist has already been made, is the selective
reenlistment bonus (SRB) . Since this study has no direct bearing
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on the reenlistment decisions, and does not provide explicit
estimates of the effects of sea pay or sea duty on reenlistment
length, its major results are noted briefly. Warner and Goldberg
found that length of reenlistment was positively related to the
average annual bonus, the payment of a lump sum bonus, and a
higher civilian unemployment rate. They also found that when
Congressionally mandated bonus limits were binding, the average
length of reenlistment was reduced.
More relevant to this evaluation is the Goldberg and Warner
(1983) study of extensions and reenlistments. A reenlistment is
defined as the signing of a contract for at least three years of
additional service, whereas an extension is the signing of a
contract for less than three years. A utility maximization model
of the joint decision to reenlist, extend or leave the Navy is
used to derive a multinomial logit model. Since the data are
grouped, not individual (i.e., reenlistment rates and extension
rates are calculated for cells as described above) , multiple
regression analysis can be used to estimate two log-odds
equations for reenlistment vs. leaving and extension vs. leaving.
The primary independent variable is ACOL, which differs between
reenlistments and extensions because those who reenlist receive a
bonus whereas those who extend do not. The equations also
include variables to control for the civilian unemployment rate,
expected future sea duty, length of service, marital status,
race, educational level, mental group and expiration of contracts
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in the late months of fiscal years 1977 through 1980. 1 The
equations were estimated for nine occupational groups, and for
both first-and second-term reenlist/extend decisions.
The ACOL variable has the expected positive effect on first-
term reenlistments and extensions, the estimates being
significant in eight of nine groups. 2 The results for the
expected sea duty variable are mixed. With respect to
reenlistments, it is significantly negative in five of nine
groups, but positive for three groups (significant for one of
them) . A similar pattern was also found in the extension
equations, although there were fewer significant coefficients.
The second-term results are similar for the ACOL variable,
but even less consistent for expected sea duty. The extension
equations produced three significantly positive estimates, but
only two estimates that were significantly negative. The second-
term reenlistment results were similarly mixed, but with fewer
significant coefficients. In general, these inconsistent results
for expected future sea duty are both puzzling and disturbing.
There are several possible explanations: enlisted personnel
self-select into ratings, and therefore are not necessarily
adversely affected by the prospect of future sea duty; the
'This variable was included to capture the effects of
individuals who in those years could execute short extensions
into the next fiscal years in order to subsequently receive
larger SRB's (see Goldberg and Warner, pp. 35-36)
.
2The estimation process constrains the ACOL coefficient to
be the same for both extensions and reenlistments. This
constraint is tested by Radtke (1984), discussed below.
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variable used is a poor proxy for the effect of sea duty on
reenlistment/extension decisions; the sea pay differential
offsets partially the negative effects of sea duty (that
differential is not accounted for in the ACOL variable)
.
In addition to the problems just noted with regard to the
sea duty variable, there are other difficulties with the study.
Unlike the first study of reenlistments discussed above (Warner
and Goldberg, 1981) , this study uses cell averages for all the
variables, including the reenlistment and extension rates. 3 The
results are thus subject to aggregation bias of indeterminant
amount and direction. Also, the effects of sea pay can only be
inferred indirectly through the coefficients of the ACOL
variable. In fact, Goldberg and Warner use the ACOL coefficients
only to evaluate the impact of an increase in reenlistment
bonuses or regular military compensation, and don't calculate the
effects of changes in sea pay.
Radtke 's (1984) thesis extends the Goldberg and Warner study
in two ways. First, it includes more recent data, which covers a
period of substantial increases in sea pay. Second, the study
attempts to estimate directly the effects of sea pay on
reenlistments and extensions. Radtke thus tests the implicit
assumption of Goldberg and Warner that pay elasticities are the
same regardless of the pay source (i.e., regular military
compensation, reenlistment bonuses or sea pay) . Radtke also
3The 1982 study used individual data within 16 occupational
groups.
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estimates several additional specifications of the two log-odds
equations. Goldberg and Warner assume that the effect of ACOL is
the same on reenlistments and extensions (i.e., the coefficients
of ACOL in the two equations are constrained to be equal) .
Radtke's models allow the different pay sources to have different
effects on reenlistments and extensions, and in some cases the
same pay source to have different effects on reenlistments and on
extensions.
In one model, reenlistment bonuses are constrained to have
an impact on extensions that is equal to, but opposite in sign
from its effect on reenlistments. The exact specification of
these models is given in Radtke, and summarized by Cooke (1985) .
With respect to the data used, other variables included in the
model, and estimation procedure (logistic regression), Radtke's
work parallels that of Goldberg and Warner.
With four variants of a two-equation model Radtke's work is
not easily summarized. The first model, which is the same as the
Goldberg and Warner specification, has results similar to the
earlier study. The pay coefficients are positive and significant
for each of the nine occupational groups, and for equations that
pool the nine groups (not estimated by Goldberg and Warner) . The
coefficients for expected sea duty are mostly negative, the major
exception being the health occupations group.
Radtke's second model estimates separate effects for sea
pay, although both the ACOL and sea pay variables are constrained
to have equal effects on reenlistments and extensions. The
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common effect of sea pay on reenlistments and extensions is
positive for eight of the nine groups, and significant in five of
them. It is also highly significant for the pooled model. As
Radtke notes (pp. 50-51) , some sea pay coefficients are larger,
and some smaller than the coefficients for "other pay." For some
groups the sea pay coefficient is three to four times larger than
the other pay coefficient, but the difference for the pooled
group is small and not statistically significant (Cooke, 1985)
.
Radtke 's third model allows sea pay and reenlistment bonuses
to have separate effects on reenlistments and on extensions,
although other pay is still constrained to have the same effect
on both choices. With five different pay variables in the two
equations, the results of this model are difficult to summarize.
The "other pay" coefficient is no longer positive for every
group, and is significantly negative in one case. For the pooled
sample, however, it remains significantly positive. Much of the
impact of the pay variable has been picked up by the sea pay and
bonus variables.
The effect of sea pay on reenlistments is negative for the
pooled group, and for six of the nine occupational groups.
However, the effect of sea pay is positive on extensions in every
case, and significant in all but two of them. Radtke does not
discuss the negative sea pay/reenlistment estimates, but they are
contrary to expectations. A possible explanation is that the use
of so many pay variables has caused multi-collinearity, which in
extreme cases can cause sign reversals among the highly
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correlated variables. Since these models are estimated over a
pooled cross-section/time series sample, this possibility is
greater if sea pay and bonus increases are correlated over time.
This question needs further analysis since the results are
contrary to theoretical predictions and to common sense.
In this third model, Radtke finds expected sea duty has a
generally negative effect on both reenlistments and extensions,
as expected. The reenlistment bonus variable has the expected
positive effects on reenlistments and negative effects on
extensions. To summarize, Radtke's third model, while appealing
since it estimates separate sea pay effects, produces perverse
results with respect to reenlistments for that crucial variable.
Cooke (1985, p. 28) notes the strong negative impact of
bonuses on extensions in Radtke's third model suggests that
"reenlistments and extensions are closer substitutes than
reenlistments and leaving." This may have led Radtke to his
fourth model, which constrains bonuses to have an effect on
extensions that is equal to, but opposite in sign from, its
effect on reenlistments. In this version, sea pay is again
allowed to have an effect separate from the "other pay" and bonus
variables, but both it and "other pay" are constrained to have
equal effects on reenlistments and extensions. The results for
this model show sea pay having a consistently positive common
effect on reenlistments and extensions. These results are
consistent with Radtke's model 2 results. However, one cannot
help but wonder, in light of the model 3 results, to what extent
17
these effects are an artifact of the constrained estimation
procedure. The positive effects of sea pay on extensions found
in model 3 were generally much larger than the comparable
negative effects on reenlistments. The common sea pay effects of
models 2 and 4 may therefore be masking the more complex pattern
of model 3. A separate study by Goldberg (1985) tested the
assumptions that pay effects should be constrained to be equal in
both equations, and that the reenlist/extend/leave the Navy
choices are truly independent. His results suggest that those
assumptions are not valid, adding support to the need for a more
thorough investigation of these issues. The implication that
raising sea pay may increase extensions at the expense of
reenlistments has far-reaching implications for Navy manpower
planning.
There are several other studies that relate to sea pay and
either reenlistments or extensions. Since these studies,
described below, do not provide original estimates of sea pay
effects, they are discussed here in less detail. However, some
of the ideas presented in these studies are useful in assessing
the state of knowledge of sea pay effects.
Zulli and Shelor (1985) attempted to study the effects of
sea pay on voluntary extensions of sea duty. This approach can
provide a useful addition to the Navy's ability to plan for
effective manpower utilization. Since manning ships is a
critical manpower problem, extensions of sea duty is a potential
alternative to increasing general reenlistments and extensions.
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It may also be an economical alternative, since enlisted men are
retained in positions for which they are trained, and there are
no relocation costs.
Unfortunately, the Zulli-Shelor study was never completed.
It provided a detailed analysis of Navy assignment policy,
essential to modeling sea duty extension decisions, and outlined
the date sources and models to be estimated. However, absence of
continued funding prevented compilation of the data and
estimation of model parameters. It is interesting to note that
the empirical model specified by Zulli and Shelor included a
variable to capture the negative effects on extensions of past
sea duty. Their proxy was an average of underway days by
quarter, and they note that absence of this variable could result
in bias to the coefficient of the sea pay variable. This is
analogous to the argument made above that past sea duty may
affect reenlistment and extension decisions, and should be
included in the models in addition to (or perhaps in lieu of)
expected future sea duty.
A study by Goldberg (1982) compares the incremental cost per
retained person of different types of pay increases.
Reenlistment bonuses, pay increases across the board and targeted
by pay grade, and sea pay increases were considered. The per
person first-term retention cost was highest for sea pay. The
sea pay calculations were based on the results of an earlier
study by Warner and Simon (1979), and have several shortcomings.
Cooke (1985) notes that in the Goldberg study "sea pay is assumed
19
to be paid to everyone for all time at sea and that only future
sea pay is assumed to affect retention" (p. 31). Cooke also notes
that the possible effects of past sea pay and sea duty on the
reenlistment/extensions/leave decision are not tested. The
methodological and data limitations of this study render its cost
estimates suspect, and thus possibly misleading.
A study by Frankel and Butler (1984) compares the cost of
two ways of increasing sea duty: creating rotation billets
(shore billets needed to provide some shore time) and increasing
sea pay. Since each way has a cost, the authors ask under what
conditions will each by advantageous (i.e. the lower cost way of
obtaining additional sea duty) . Their answer is to calculate
break-even elasticities, which provide ranges for which sea pay
will be more or less effective than rotation billets. These
break-even values can be compared to estimated sea pay supply
elasticities, when good estimates of those elasticities are
available. Frankel and Butler find that the break-even sea pay
elasticities are quite low, generally below unity, and conclude
that even if enlisted personnel "are relatively unresponsive to
sea pay increases, increases in sea tour length elicited by
increased sea pay would be more than compensated by shore billet
savings. " (p. 3)
.
The method used by Frankel and Butler to calculate the break
even elasticities utilizes the Force Analysis Simulation Model
(FASM) , a computer based simulation model developed for the Navy
by the SAG Corporation. This model is run under varying
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assumptions about sea/shore rotation rates, and the resulting
cost savings 4 are used to calculate the desired elasticities.
Although an evaluation of the FASM model is beyond the scope of
this study (and it has been revised subsequent to its use by
Frankel and Butler) , it is possible to assess its validity for
the present study. As used by Frankel and Butler the FASM model
has several shortcomings. Most importantly, Frankel and Butler
suppress changes in retention rates when they change the
sea/shore rotation rate. This is a clearly unrealistic
assumption, since we know that in general a higher sea/shore
ratio will decrease retention rates. (Goldberg and Warner, and
Radtke) . In fact the authors' method of calculating the break-
even elasticities is fatally flawed because it assumes that the
retention rates are unaffected by sea/shore rotation, although
the trade-off between the two is the theoretical basis for the
study. The authors' calculations also include the assumption
"that sea pay elasticities are the same among all paygrade /LOS
cells ..." (LOS cells are length of service cells). The impact
of this assumption is unknown, but the authors do not attempt a
sensitivity analysis which might suggest how relaxing that
assumption would affect their estimates.
A recent study by Cooke and Garvey (198 6) attempts to
estimate the retention effects of changes in sea pay proposed by
Congress for FY 1987. Very briefly, the revised sea pay tables
4The model provides least-cost force estimates for any set
of assumptions.
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would increase sea pay for grades E5 through E7 with five or more
years of cumulative sea duty, but reduce sea pay for grades E4
through E9 with less than five years cumulative sea duty. Cooke
and Garvey used a rating-specific version of CNA's ACOL
simulation model (Cymrot and Garvey, 1986) to estimate the
retention effects of the sea pay changes for four rating groups
(sea intensive; mission critical, sea intensive; mission
critical, some sea billets; mission critical, no sea billets).
They find that the first two groups, which are sea intensive, are
most strongly affected by the increased sea pay. This result
derives primarily from the fact that these groups necessarily
contain a higher percentage of personnel who are eligible for the
increased sea pay. (Note that the retention-pay elasticities of
the four groups do not differ very substantially - see table 3,
p. 7) . This study is an interesting exercise since it provides
an opportunity to test the ACOL model. It would be instructive
to compare actual retention data to that predicted by the model.
Cooke (198 6) has conducted a study of sea duty and sea pay
that is best viewed as preliminary to improved estimation of
retention effects. There are two major findings that are
relevant to developing improved retention models. First, Cooke
finds that the variance in sea duty within ratings is as large as
its variance across ratings. Second, he finds that for some
personnel, loss of shore allowances substantially offsets sea
pay, so that total compensation is not very different at sea than
in a shore billet.
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The importance for retention modeling of the latter finding
is obvious: models must fully and accurately measure the net pay
change associated with sea duty to accurately estimate its
effect. With respect to the first finding, Cooke concludes that
future research should "address the relationship of variation in
sea duty within ratings to retention." (p. 30). These findings,
along with some of the limitations of previous studies noted
above, form the bases for the research agenda proposed in the
following section.
Ill . State of Knowledge
This section identifies the gaps in our knowledge of the
retention effects of sea pay and sea duty. To do that, we begin
with an outline of what Navy manpower planners should want to
know. A comparison with what is known from existing research
identifies the knowledge gaps.
The Navy should want to know:
(1) The effect of sea pay on voluntary extensions of sea duty.
(2) The impacts of sea pay and sea duty on reenlistment and
extension probabilities, separately for
(a) First and second term personnel
(b) Sea intensive and mission critical ratings
(c) Mental groups
(d) Length of reenlistment
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(3) The effect of extending on subsequent reenlistment
probabilities. 5
Where are we now? The literature reviewed above provides
preliminary estimates of reenlistment and extension probabilities
for first and second term stay/leave decisions for various
ratings groups. Those estimates suffer from a variety of
statistical and data-related shortcomings, and can therefore only
be considered tentative, useful with proper reservations, until
replaced by better figures. There are currently no studies of
qualitative retention effects i.e., whether high mental group
personnel are more or less responsive to sea pay and sea duty
variations than low mental group persons. This is an overlooked
but an important part of assessing the Navy's ability to perform
its mission. There are also no studies of how extending effects
the subsequent probability of reenlisting. 6 This issue is
important because it will impact on the experience distribution
of the enlisted force. It is also necessary to study this
interaction to learn whether some extensions are merely
mechanisms to take advantage of anticipated higher subsequent
reenlistment bonuses.
5This list is certainly not exhaustive, but includes the
major factors that manpower planners need to calculate
endstrength and readiness effects of changes in sea pay and/or
sea duty.
6Cymrot (1987) has conducted a study that showed that Marine




A research agenda for studying the impacts on retention of
sea pay and sea duty should aim to satisfy two general goals:
improving existing estimates that are limited by data quality or
modeling deficiencies; and identifying neglected areas of
research. This section addresses each of those goals.
A major conclusion of this study is that future research
should utilize individual data, not cell averages. The original
Warmer and Goldberg (1982) study used individual data, although
divided into 16 occupational groups. Subsequent studies (e.g.
Goldberg and Warmer, and Radtke) used aggregated data, apparently
to permit use of regression techniques that could adjust for data
deficiencies associated with pooling time-series and cross-section
data. The problems of aggregation bias, large within groups
variances in critical variables (e.g. sea duty) and the
difficulty of modeling inter-temporal behavior, such as
extensions and subsequent reenlistments, all argue against this
approach. Moreover, the difference in pay associated with sea
duty varies among individuals in the same cell, as a result of
marital status. There have been many recent advances in the
application of multivariate techniques to discrete choices using
panel data (pooled cross-section and time-series). 7 The
potential gains appear to outweigh the additional effort and
computing cost of these more complex procedures.
7See the recent survey article by Maddala (1987).
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A second major conclusion is that subsequent research should
incorporate some of the wealth of data contained in the Annual
Survey of Officers and Enlisted Personnel. The survey contains
much information on satisfaction with military life, some of
which have been shown to be significantly related to intentions
to remain in the Navy (Marsh, 1988). 8 In addition, the influence
of past sea duty should also be included in future studies.
These data can be obtained from the Enlisted Master File. The
perverse results for future sea duty obtained by Radtke may be in
past due to self-selection, or other factors noted above.
Control for past sea duty, which varies substantially within
ratings (Cooke, 1986) , might correctly identify the true effects
of sea duty on retention.
A third major conclusion is that studies of the retention
effects of sea pay and sea duty should be broadened to consider
the quality of personnel who reenlist, extend, or leave the
Navy. 9 The importance of the quality of retained personnel is
underscored by two factors: the growing complexity of weapons
systems and the use of computer controls will continue to
increase the need for enlisted personnel capable of being trained
to operate these complex systems; budgetary constrains in the
8Thesis research being conducted at the Naval Postgraduate
School by LT Anne-Marie Rearden, under my supervision, shows that
there are significant effects of satisfaction variables and
reenlistment intentions on actual reenlistments.
9Such research may also need to consider differential
attrition rates prior to reenlistment decisions.
26
future are likely to increase the emphasis on quality of
personnel, since their quantity may well be limited. The use of
models based on individual data will facilitate separate
estimates for each quality group.
The fourth major conclusion is that the relationship between
extending and subsequent reenlistment should be studied. This
relationship has two important implications: if some personnel
are extending in order to subsequently receive higher
reenlistment bonuses a redesign of the bonuses system may be
warranted; if extenders are more likely to reenlist (after
allowing for SRB's) , then the possible negative consequences of
an extension compared to a reenlistment is largely mitigated.
However, this issue then raises the question "Why do enlisted
personnel extend rather than reenlist, if they eventually
reenlist anyway?" Although one might speculate that some
individuals are simply not ready at the first decision point to
make the longer term commitment, a thorough study of the factors
that influence that choice seems desirable.
The first, second and fourth conclusions all relate in
different ways to how analysts should model the
reenlistment/extension/leave the Navy decision, and then best
estimate the model parameters. This issue is fundamental to
future research on the effects of sea pay, and is thus discussed
here in more depth. Although model development and testing are
major undertakings, not feasible under the limitations of this
study, some suggestions in this area are appropriate.
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First, the impact of sea pay on reenlistments must be
estimated separately from the effects of other types of pay.
Since sea pay is always associated with certain undesirable job
characteristics, its impact on reenlistments should differ from
that of other pays unless the offsetting negative utility of
those job features can be perfectly measured and controlled for.
Future research should perhaps begin by recognizing that the
primary impact of sea pay is a sea duty vis-a-vis shore duty: it
is a compensating differential intended to make sea duty
relatively less unattractive. Further, the secondary effect of
sea pay on reenlistments or extensions needs to also consider the
impact of the associated sea duty, as in Radtke's study.
Second, more thought should be given as to the possible
decision processes of enlisted personnel. The Goldberg-Warner
and Radtke models that assume a three-way choice among
independent alternatives is only one way to approach the problem.
There are three other possible choice models: 10 (1) a stay/leave
decision is made first, then a reenlistment/extension decision
for stayers; (2) a reenlist/not reenlistment decision followed by
an extend/leave decision for non-reenlisters; (3) an extend/not
extend decision, then a reenlist/leave decision for non-
extenders.
Each of these alternatives poses different modeling and
estimation problems. However, statistical models and software
are now available to test those alternatives against the three-
10 I thank Tim Cooke for suggesting these alternatives.
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way choice model, using individual data. Goldberg (1985)
attempted some tests of these nested logit models using grouped
data estimates.
Third, the self-selection issue needs explicit treatment. If
selection into sea-intensive ratings is correlated with
sensitivity of reenlistment behavior to pay changes, then
estimates of the effects of sea pay on both retention and sea
duty will be biased. Although the statistical procedures to
adjust for selection bias are now well-known, and soft-ware
widely available, the correct modeling of this complex process
has not yet been done. Moreover, it may be quite difficult to
simultaneously adjust for selection bias and test for correct
specification of the decision process, as described above.
In summary, this study has recommended several ways to
improve past retention research, and identified several related
areas that have not been studied at all. There is not much that
is original here, as many of the shortcomings of previous studies
have been noted by others, especially Tim Cooke. The paper does,
however, bring together ideas that were scattered among a number
of different papers. The idea of studying the quality of
retained personnel is new, but may find few advocates among Navy
manpower planners, since research on sea pay and retention is
currently not a high priority. Nonetheless, this agenda can
serve as the basis of new retention research if those priorities
should change in the future.
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